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Expressive Attribute-Based Encryption with Constant-Size Ciphertexts from the Decisional Linear Assumption * Katsuyuki TAKASHIMA †a) , Senior Member SUMMARY We propose a key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme with constant-size ciphertexts, whose almost tightly semiadaptive security is proven under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption in the standard model. The access structure is expressive, that is given by non-monotone span programs. It also has fast decryption, i.e., a decryption includes only a constant number of pairing operations. As an application of our KP-ABE construction, we also propose an efficient, fully secure attribute-based signatures with constant-size secret (signing) keys from the DLIN. For achieving the above results, we extend the sparse matrix technique on dual pairing vector spaces. In particular, several algebraic properties of an elaborately chosen sparse matrix group are applied to the dual system security proofs. key words: attribute-based encryption, constant-size ciphertexts, attributebased signatures, constant-size signing keys, non-monotone span programs, decisional linear assumption 1. Introduction
Backgrounds
The notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) introduced by Sahai and Waters [2] is an advanced class of encryption and provides more flexible and fine-grained functionalities in sharing and distributing sensitive data than traditional symmetric and public-key encryption as well as recent identity-based encryption. In ABE systems, either one of the parameters for encryption and secret key is a set of attributes, and the other is an access policy (structure) over a universe of attributes, e.g., a secret key for a user is associated with an access policy and a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. A secret key with a policy can decrypt a ciphertext associated with a set of attributes, iff the attribute set satisfies the policy. If the access policy is for a secret key, it is called key-policy ABE (KP-ABE), and if the access policy is for encryption, it is ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE).
All the existing practical ABE schemes have been constructed by (bilinear) pairing groups, and the largest class of Manuscript received March 15, 2019. Manuscript revised July 11, 2019. † The author is with the Information Technology R&D Center, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Kamakura-shi, 247-8501 Japan.
* An extended abstract of a preliminary version of this paper was presented in [1] at SCN 2014. This provides significant technical contributions over [1] , e.g., the full security proofs with better (i.e., semi-adaptive) security than selective one in [1] for our KP-ABE scheme, and scheme description and security proof of our ABS with short secret keys (with the underlying CP-ABE scheme). Refer to Sects. 6, 7 and Appendices A-E. a) E-mail: Takashima.Katsuyuki@aj.MitsubishiElectric.co.jp DOI: 10.1587/transfun.2019CIP0009 relations supported by the ABE schemes is non-monotone span programs (or non-monotone span programs with innerproduct relations [3] ). Non-monotone predicates should be used in many ABE applications, for example, in CP-ABE, some individuals or group members can be easily excluded from decryptable users just by using non-monotone predicates on attributes in ciphertexts. While general (polynomial size) circuits are supported [4] , [5] recently, they are much less efficient than the pairing-based ABE schemes and non-practical when the relations are limited to span programs. Since our aim is to achieve constant-size ciphertexts in the sizes of attribute set or access policy in expressive ABE, hereafter, we focus on pairing-based ABE with span program access structures. Here, "constant" is valid as long as the description of the attribute or policy is not considered a part of the ciphertext, which is a common assumption in the ABE application. Hence, we use "constant" in this sense hereafter.
While the expressive access control (span programs) is very attractive, it also requires additional cost in terms of ciphertext size and decryption time. Emura et al. [6] , Herranz et al. [7] , and Chen et al. [8] constructed ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts, but their access structures are very limited. Attrapadung, Libert and Panafieu [9] first constructed a KP-ABE scheme for span programs with constant-size ciphertexts and fast decryption which needs only a constant-number of pairing operations. While Attrapadung et al.'s KP-ABE scheme (and subsequent works [10] - [14] ) show an interesting approach to achieving constant-size ciphertexts with expressive access structures, the security are proven only based on q-type assumptions (e.g., n-DBDHE assumption with n the maximum number of attributes per ciphertext and more complex EDHE assumptions). Previously, since the introduction by Mitsunari et al. [15] and Boneh et al. [16] , various kinds of q-type assumptions have been widely used in order to achieve efficient cryptographic primitives [7] , [17] - [20] . However, the assumptions (and also the associated schemes) suffered a special attack which was presented by Cheon [21] at Eurocrypt 2006. Subsequently, Sakemi et al. [22] have shown that the attack can be a real threat to q-type assumption-based cryptographic primitives by executing a successful experiment. Consequently, it is very desirable that the above schemes should be replaced by an efficiency-comparable alternative scheme based on a static (non-q-type) assumption instead of a q-type assumption.
In concurrent and independent work, Chen and Wee
Copyright c 2020 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers Table 1 Comparison of our scheme with KP-ABE for span programs with constant-size ciphertexts in [9] , [11] , [23] , where |G|, |G T |, n, , r, ν 1 and ν represent size of an element of a bilinear source group G, that of a target group G T , the maximum number of attributes per ciphertext, the number of rows and columns in access structure matrix for the secret key, the maximum number of the adversary's pre-challenge key queries, and that of the adversary's all key queries, respectively. PK, SK, CT, and (N)M-SP stand for public key, secret key, ciphertext, and (non-)monotone span program, respectively.
ALP11 [9] CW14 [23] AC16 [24] A16 [12] AC17 [13] A19 [14] Proposed [10] , CT size is reduced to 2 |G| + 1 |G T |. [23] introduced the notion of semi-adaptive security for ABE, where the adversary specifies the challenge attribute set after it sees the public parameters but before it makes any secret key queries. In [23] , they also constructed a smalluniverse, almost tightly semi-adaptive KP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts on composite-order groups, where almost tight security means that the reduction factor from a static assumption is a polynomial in security parameter λ and does not depend on the (maximum) number of key queries [25] . Agrawal and Chase [24] presented a generic construction for several kinds of ABE including KP-and CP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts (which are given in Appendice E and D in the full version [24] ). While the generic approach is attractive, however, the obtained shortciphertext ABE schemes treat with only monotone span programs for access policies.
Hence, to construct an (almost) tightly secure, constant-size ciphertext KP-ABE scheme with nonmonotone span program access policies from a static assumption in the prime-order groups remains an interesting open problem in terms of practical and theoretical aspects on ABE.
The above technique can be applied to construct a new attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme. The concept of ABS was introduced by Maji et al. in 2008 [26] . Since then, many ABS constructions have been proposed including [27] - [33] . A generic construction given in [30] is interesting, however, it cannot achieve the standard ABS security, i.e., unforgeability and anonymity, simultaneously, as pointed out in [31] . El Kaafarani-Katsumata's scheme [31] is proven just in the random oracle model. While most of existing works (in the standard model) [27] , [28] , [32] , [33] give no constant-size secret key ABS schemes, Sakai et al.'s ABS scheme [29] not only has expressive policies but also has constant-size keys. However, as pointed out in Remark 3.1 in [33] , it is impractical for using in real world ap-plications, since the available policies are given by binary circuits. Hence, our target w.r.t. ABS is as follows: Can we construct a constant-size secret key ABS scheme which is proven fully secure in the standard model and efficient enough for real world applications ?
Our Results
• We propose a KP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts, whose almost tightly semi-adaptive security is proven from the DLIN assumption in the standard model (Sects. 5 and 6). The access structure is expressive, that is given by non-monotone span programs. It also has fast decryption: a decryption includes only a constant number of pairing operations, i.e., 17 pairings independently of the sizes of the used attribute set and access structure. For comparison of our scheme with previous KP-ABE for span programs with constantsize ciphertexts, see Table 1 (in which a composite order group based one given in [11] is omitted since it is surpassed by a more desirable prime-order based one [12] by the same author). • As an application of our KP-ABE construction, we also propose a fully secure ABS scheme with constant-size secret (signing) keys from the DLIN assumption in the standard model (Sect. 7). The policies for the ABS are also given by non-monotone span programs with input attributes from large universes, and the proposed scheme is efficient enough for using in real world applications. • For achieving the above results, we extend the sparse matrix technique on dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [3] , [34] , [35] developed in [36] . In particular, several algebraic properties of an elaborately chosen sparse matrix group H y (n, F q ) are applied to the dual system security proofs. For the details, see Sects. 1.3, 4 and 6.4.
Key Techniques
We extend the sparse matrix technique on DPVS developed in [36] , in which constant-size ciphertext zero/nonzero inner-product encryption are constructed from DLIN on a sparse matrix master key pair. Using the basic construction [36] , to achieve short ciphertexts in our KP-ABE, attributes Γ := {x j } j=1,...,n are encoded in an n-dimensional (with n ≥ n + 1) vector y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n n j=1 (z − x j ). Each (non-zero) attribute value v i (for i = 1, . . . , ) associated with a row of access structure matrix M (in S) is encoded as v i := (v n−1 i , . . . , v i , 1), so y · v i = v n−1−n i n j=1 (v i − x j ), and the value of inner product is equal to zero if and only if v i = x j for some j, i.e., v i ∈ Γ. Here, the relation between S and Γ is determined by the multiple inner product values y · v i for one vector y which is equivalent to Γ. Hence, a ciphertext vector element c 1 is encoded with ω y (for random ω), which is represented by twelve (constant in n) group elements (as well as y), and key vector elements k * i are encoded with v i and shares s i (i = 1, . . . , ) for a central secret s 0 , respectively (see Sect. 5.1 for the key idea). A standard dual system encryption (DSE) approach considers each pair of vectors in the semi-functional space, (τ y, r i e 1 + ψ i v i ) or (τ y, r i v i ) with secret shares r i of a secret r 0 and random τ, ψ i , and then the vector pair is randomized with preserving the inner product values based on a pairwise independence argument. Since we must deal with a common τ y in all the above pairs, we should modify the original argument for our scheme, which is based on a modified form of pairwise independence lemma (Lemma 3) for a specific matrix group H y (n, F q ) of size n × n.
The security of our scheme is reduced to that of DLIN through multiple reduction steps (Theorem 1). A technical challenge for the security is to insert random (sparse) matrices {Z h,i } h=1,...,ν; i=1,..., in H y (n, F q ) T to key components {k * h,i } h=1,...,ν; i=1,..., for each key query h = 1, . . . , ν even when the underlying matrix for the basis B 1 is sparse. For the purpose, first, only n randomness {Z κ } κ=1,...,n are sequentially inserted in a consistent manner with the security condition on the challenge y and key queries, and then, they are amplified to any polynomial number of random matrices, {Z h,i } h=1,...,ν; i=1,..., , by making linear combinations of {Z κ } κ=1,...,n . The above steps are accomplished by applying computational (swap) game changes and informationtheoretical (or conceptual) changes alternatingly, and by applying four nice algebraic properties of elaborately chosen sparse matrix group H y (n, F q ) to the security proof. The two key techniques are described in detail in Sects. 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, respectively.
Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y R ← A de-notes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U ← A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. When A is a set and B is a subset of A, A \ B is the difference set. We denote the finite field of order q by F q , and F q \ {0} by F × q . A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q , e.g., x denotes (
The vector 0 is abused as the zero vector in F N q for any N. X T denotes the transpose of matrix X. A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g., x ∈ V.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces and Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption
For simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [34] , [35] constructed using symmetric bilinear pairing groups. For the asymmetric version of DPVS, see Appendix A.2 of the full version of [3] .
Definition 1: "Symmetric bilinear pairing groups" (q, G, G T , G, e) are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic additive group G and multiplicative group G T of order q, G 0 ∈ G, and a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T i.e., e(sG, tG) = e(G, G) st and e(G, G) 1. Let G bpg be an algorithm that takes input 1 λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing groups (q, G, G T , G, e) with security parameter λ. "Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)" of dimension N by a direct product of symmetric pairing groups (q, G, G T , G, e) are given by prime q, N-dimensional vec-
. , G N ) ∈ V and y := (H 1 , . . . , H N ) ∈ V. This is nondegenerate bilinear i.e., e(sx, ty) = e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ V, then x = 0.
For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary E, the advantage Adv DLIN E (λ) is negligible in λ.
Definitions of Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption and Attribute-Based Signatures
Span Programs and Non-Monotone Access Structures
Definition 3 (Span Programs [37] ): U (⊂ {0, 1} * ) is a universe, a set of attributes, which is expressed by a value of attribute, i.e., v ∈ F × q (:= F q \ {0}). A span program over F q is a labeled matrix S := (M, ρ) where M is a ( × r) matrix over F q and ρ is a labeling of the rows of M by literals from {v, v , . . . , ¬v, ¬v , . . .} (every row is labeled by one literal), i.e., ρ : {1, . . . , } → {v, v , . . . , ¬v, ¬v , . . .}.
A span program accepts or rejects an input by the following criterion. Let Γ be a set of attributes, i.e., Γ := {x j } 1≤ j≤n . When Γ is given to access structure S, map γ : {1, . . . , } → {0, 1} for span program S := (M, ρ) is defined as follows:
The span program S accepts Γ if and only if 1 ∈ span (M i ) γ(i)=1 , i.e., some linear combination of the rows (M i ) γ(i)=1 gives the all one vector 1. (The row vector has the value 1 in eciphertextsach coordinate.)
A span program is called monotone if the labels of the rows are only the positive literals {v, v , . . .}. Monotone span programs compute monotone functions. (So, a span program in general is "non"-monotone.)
We assume that no row M i (i = 1, . . . , ) of the matrix M is 0. We now construct a secret-sharing scheme for a non-monotone span program.
Definition 4:
A secret-sharing scheme for span program S := (M, ρ) is:
Then, s 0 := 1 · f T = r k=1 f k is the secret to be shared, and s T := (s 1 , . . . , s ) T := M · f T is the shares of the secret s 0 and the share s i belongs to ρ(i).
If span program
. . , } | γ(i) = 1} and i∈I α i s i = s 0 . Furthermore, these constants {α i } can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M.
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)
In key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE), encryption (resp. a secret key) is associated with attributes Γ (resp. access structure S). Relation R for KP-ABE is defined as R(S, Γ) = 1 iff access structure S accepts Γ.
Definition 5: (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption: KP-ABE) A key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme consists of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec. They are given as follows:
Setup takes as input security parameter 1 λ and a bound on the number of attributes per ciphertext n. It outputs public parameters pk and master secret key sk. KeyGen takes as input public parameters pk, master secret key sk, and access structure S := (M, ρ). It outputs a corresponding secret key sk S . Enc takes as input public parameters pk, message m in some associated message space msg, and a set of attributes, Γ := {x j } 1≤ j≤n . It outputs a ciphertext ct Γ . Dec takes as input public parameters pk, secret key sk S for access structure S, and ciphertext ct Γ that was encrypted under a set of attributes Γ. It outputs either m ∈ msg or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
A KP-ABE scheme should have the following correct- Definition 6 (Semi-Adaptive Security): The model for defining the semi-adaptively payload-hiding security of KP-ABE under chosen plaintext attack is given by the following game:
Setup In the semi-adaptive security, the challenger runs the setup, (pk, sk) R ← Setup(1 λ , n), and gives public parameters pk to the adversary, then the adversary output a challenge attribute set, Γ. Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of key queries, S, to the challenger provided that S does not accept Γ. The challenger gives sk S R ← KeyGen(pk, sk, S) to the adversary. Challenge The adversary submits two messages m (0) , m (1) .
The challenger flips a coin b U ← {0, 1}, and computes
Γ to the adversary. Phase 2 Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that no queried S accepts challenge Γ. Guess The adversary outputs a guess b of b, and wins if b = b.
The advantage of adversary A in the semi-adaptive game is defined as Adv KP-ABE,SA A (λ) := Pr[A wins ] − 1/2 for any security parameter λ. A KP-ABE scheme is semi-adaptively payload-hiding secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the semi-adaptive game.
Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS)
Definition 7 (Attribute-Based Signatures : ABS):
An attribute-based signature scheme consists of four algorithms.
Setup This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input security parameter and a bound on the number of attributes per ciphertext n. It outputs public parameters pk and master key sk. KeyGen This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a set of attributes, Γ := {x j } 1≤ j≤n , pk and sk. It outputs signature generation key sk Γ . Sig This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input message m, access structure S := (M, ρ), signature generation key sk Γ , and public parameters pk such that S accepts Γ. It outputs signature σ. Ver This takes as input message m, access structure S, signature σ and public parameters pk. It outputs boolean value accept := 1 or reject := 0.
An ABS scheme should have the following correctness property: for all (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(pk, sk, Γ 2 ), all access structures S such that S accepts Γ 1 and S accepts Γ 2 , distributions Sig(pk, sk Γ 1 , m, S) and Sig(pk, sk Γ 2 , m, S) are equal.
Since the correct distribution on signatures can be perfectly simulated without taking any private information as input, signatures must not leak any such private information of the signer.
Definition 9 (Unforgeability): For an adversary, A, we define Adv ABS,UF A (λ) to be the success probability in the following experiment for any security parameter λ. An ABS scheme is existentially unforgeable if the success probability of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible:
1. Run (sk, pk) R ← Setup(1 λ , n) and give pk to the adversary.
2.
A may adaptively makes a polynomial number of queries of the following type:
• [ Create key ] A asks the challenger to create a signing key for an attribute set Γ. The challenger creates a key for Γ without giving it to A. • [ Create signature ] A specifies a key for attribute set Γ that has already been created, and asks the challenger to perform a signing operation to create a signature for a message m and an access structure S that accepts Γ. The challenger computes the signature without giving it to the adversary. • [ Reveal key or signature ] A asks the challenger to reveal an already-created key for an attribute set Γ, or an already-created signature for an access structure S.
Note that when key or signature creation requests are made, A does not automatically see the created key or signature. A sees it only when it makes a reveal query. 3. At the end, the adversary outputs (m , S , σ ).
We say the adversary succeeds if a correctly-created signature for (m , S ) was never revealed to the adversary, S does not accept any Γ queried to the reveal key oracle, and Ver(pk, m , S , σ ) = 1.
Remark 1: Since a signing query in the unforgeability definition in [27] , [28] is made only with an access structure S, the challenger should find an attribute set Γ that satisfies S, and generate a key sk Γ with Γ and a signature with S using (Γ, sk Γ ). In general, however, the challenger may not always find a suitable Γ from S in a polynomial time since it includes the problem of solving the satisfiability for any DNF and CNF formulas with polynomial sizes. In this sense, the definition of unforgeability in [27] , [28] is problematic.
To address this issue, as in [38] , our definition of unforgeability introduces four types of queries, create and reveal queries for keys and signatures, in a manner similar to the security definition for key-delegation by Shi and Waters [39] . Here, to obtain a signature for S from the challenger, the adversary is required to give an attribute set Γ that satisfies S to the challenger in advance (i.e., the challenger has no need to find a suitable Γ by itself.)
Special Matrix Subgroups
Lemmas 1-4 are key lemmas for the security proof for our KP-ABE and ABS schemes. The proofs of Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 are given in Appendix A.
For positive integers w, n and y := (y 1 , .., y n ) ∈ F n q \ span e n , let
..,n ∈ F n q , u n 0, y · u = y n , a blank element in the matrix
(2)
and H y (n, F q ) are subgroups of GL(n, F q ). More specifically,
Lemma 1 is directly verified from the definition of (isotropy) groups.
Lemma 2: H y (n, F q ) has a linear structure as H y (n, F q ) A n−1 \ H n−2 , where A n−1 := { u ∈ F n q | y· u = y n } is an (n−1)dimensional affine space and H n−2 := A n−1 ∩ {u n = 0} is a hyperplane section of A n−1 .
For all (Z κ ∈ H y (n, F q ) T ) κ=1,...,n such that ( Z κ := Z κ − Z 1 ) κ=2,...,n is a basis of linear subspace V n−1 :
Next is a key lemma for applying the proof techniques in [3] to our KP-ABE and ABS schemes.
Lemma 3: For all y ∈ F n q \span e n and π ∈ F q , let W y,π :
and permutation on [wn] := {1, . . . , wn} as :
[wn]
We denote the corresponding permutation matrix by Π, i.e., the left multiplication by Π is equivalent to the permutation on rows of matrices in F wn × wn q .
Lemma 4: L(w, n, F q ) and P(w, n, F q ) are subgroups of GL(wn, F q ). Moreover, L(w, n, F q ) is the conjugate of P(w, n, F q ) by Π, i.e., L(w, n, F q ) = Π −1 · P(w, n, F q ) · Π.
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix A (Lemma 2 and its proof) in the full version of [36] .
Remark 2: For matrix W := (w i, j ) i, j=1,...,N ∈ F N×N q and element g :
by a natural multiplication of a N-dim. row vector and a N × N matrix. Thus it holds an associative law as (gW)W −1 = g(WW −1 ) = g and a pairing invariance property e(gW, h(W −1 ) T ) = e(g, h) for any g, h ∈ V.
Proposed KP-ABE Scheme with Constant Size Ciphertexts

Key Ideas in Constructing the Proposed KP-ABE Scheme
In this section, we will explain key ideas of constructing and proving the security of the proposed KP-ABE scheme. First, we will show how short ciphertexts and efficient decryption can be achieved in our scheme, where the IPE scheme given in [36] is used as a building block. Here, we will use a simplified (or toy) version of the proposed KP-ABE scheme, for which the security is no more ensured in the standard model under the DLIN assumption.
A ciphertext in the simplified KP-ABE scheme consists of two vector elements, (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ G 5 × G n , and c T ∈ G T . A secret key consists of +1 vector elements, (k * 0 , k * 1 , . . . , k * ) ∈ G 5 × (G n ) for access structure S := (M, ρ), where the number of rows of M is and k * i with i ≥ 1 corresponds to the i-th row. Therefore, to achieve constant-size ciphertexts, we have to compress c 1 ∈ G n to a constant size in n. We now employ a special form of basis generation matrix,
where µ, µ 1 , . . . , µ n U ← F q and a blank in the matrix denotes
. Let a ciphertext associated with
where ω U ← F q and y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z−x j ). Then, c 1 can be compressed to only two group elements (C 1 := ωµG, C 2 := ω( n i=1 y i µ i )G) as well as y, since c 1 can be obtained by (y 1 C 1 , . . . , y n−1 C 1 , C 2 ) (note that y i C 1 = y i ωµG for i = 1, . . . , n − 1). That is, a ciphertext (excluding y) can be just two group elements, or the size is constant in n.
Let B * := (b * i ) be the dual orthonormal basis of B := (b i ), and B * be the master secret key in the simplified KP-ABE scheme. We specify (c 0 , k * 0 , c T ) such that e(c 0 , k * 0 ) = g ζ−ωs 0 T and c T := g ζ T m ∈ G T with s 0 is a center secret of shares {s i } i=1,..., associated with access structure S. Using {s i } i=1,..., , we also set a secret key for S as k * i :
From the dual orthonormality of B and B * , if S accepts Γ, there exist a system of coefficients
Hence, a decryptor can compute g ωs 0 T if and only if S accepts Γ, i.e., can obtain plaintext m. Since c 1 is expressed as (y 1 C 1 , . . . , y n−1 C 1 , C 2 ) ∈ G n and k * is parsed as a n-tuple (D * 1 , . . . , D * n ) ∈ G n , the value of e(c 1 , k * ) is
. That is, n − 1 scalar multiplications in G and two pairing operations are enough for computing e(c 1 , k * ). Therefore, only a small (constant) number of pairing operations are required for decryption.
We then explain how our full KP-ABE scheme is constructed on the above-mentioned simplified KP-ABE scheme. The target of designing the full KP-ABE scheme is to achieve the selective (resp. semi-adaptive) security under the DLIN assumption. Here, we adopt and extend a strategy initiated in [3] , in which the dual system encryption methodology is employed in a modular or hierarchical manner. That is, one top level assumption, the security of Problem 1 (which is defined in Definition 10 in Sect. 6.3), is directly used in the dual system encryption methodology and the assumption is reduced to a primitive assumption, the DLIN assumption.
To meet the requirements for applying to the dual system encryption methodology and reducing to the DLIN assumption, the underlying vector space is six times greater than that of the above-mentioned simplified scheme. For example, k * i := (
and X :=
Sect. 4, where each X i, j is of the form of X ∈ H(n, F q ) in the simplified scheme. The vector space consists of four orthogonal subspaces, i.e., real encoding part, hidden part, secret key randomness part, and ciphertext randomness part. The simplified KP-ABE scheme corresponds to the first real encoding part.
A key fact in the security reduction is that L(6, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(6n, F q ) (Lemma 4), which enables a random-self-reducibility argument for reducing the intractability of Problem 1 in Definition 10 to the DLIN assumption. For the reduction, see [36] . The property that H y (n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(n, F q ) is also crucial for a special form of pairwise independence lemma in this paper (Lemma 3), where a super-group H(n, F q ) ∩ GL(n, F q )(⊃ H y (n, F q )) is specified in L(6, n, F q ) or X. Our Problem 1 employs the special form matrices {U j U ← H y (n, F q )} and {Z j := (U −1 j ) T }, and makes Lemma 3 applicable in our proof. Informally, our pairwise independence lemma implies that, for all ( y, v), a vector, vZ, is uniformly distributed over F n q \span e n ⊥ with preserving the inner-product value, y · v, i.e., vZ reveal no information but ( y and) y · v.
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G KP-ABE ob using a sparse matrix given by Eq. (3), which is used in the proposed KP-ABE scheme.
,...,6;l=1,...,n , B * 1 ).
Remark 3: Let
where a blank element in the matrix denotes 0
Construction
We note that attributes x j , v i are in F × q , i.e., nonzero.
Setup(1 λ , n) :
.,6; l=1,..,n by Eq. (5) . Decryption Dec can be alternatively described as:
return m := c T /K.
[Correctness] Since y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) is defined by the polynomial equality n−1 j=0 y n− j z j := z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ), the leading coefficient of the polynomial, y 1 , is equal to 1. Therefore, note that e(c 1 ,
6. Security of the Proposed KP-ABE Theorem 1: The proposed KP-ABE scheme is semiadaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there is probabilistic machines F 1 , F 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
. . . , n; ι = 1, 2, := (3νˆ + 10n + 11)/q, and ν is the maximum number of A's key queries,ˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices of key queries.
Proof Outline of Theorem 1
At the top level strategy of the security proof, the dual system encryption by Waters [40] is employed, where ciphertexts and secret keys have two forms, normal and semifunctional. The real system uses only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and semi-functional ciphertexts and keys are used only in subsequent security games for the security proof. Additionally, we introduce a series of refined forms of secret keys, namely, partially randomized semifuncional of type 0 and type j-ι ( j = 1, . . . , n; ι = 1, 2). The forms have some similarity to those employed in [23] , [25] , which also achieved almost tight security from static assumptions. The form of ciphertext given in the final game, which has no plaintext information, is called non-functional (in particular, it is independent of the challenge bit).
To prove this theorem, we employ Game 0 (original semi-adaptive security game) through Game 4. In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to semi-functional form, and and all queried keys are changed to partially randomized semi-functional form of type 0. In Game 2j-ι ( j = 1, . . . , n; ι = 1, 2), all queried keys are changed to partially randomized semi-functional form of type j-ι. In particular, secret keys are incrementally changed to partially randomized semi-functional form of type n-2, which has enough randomness for becoming (truly) semi-functional one. Namely, in Game 3, they are all changed to semifunctional. In Game 4, the challenge ciphertext is changed to non-functional form. In the final game, the advantage of the adversary is zero. As usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible.
We have shown that the intractability of (complicated) Problems 1 and 2 is reduced to that of the DLIN Problem through several intermediate steps, or intermediate problems, as in [3] . The vertical reductions are also indicated in Fig. 1 . The reduction steps indicated by dotted arrows can be shown in the same manner as those in the full version of [3] .
A normal secret key (with access structure S), is the correct form of the secret key of the proposed KP-ABE scheme, and is expressed by Eq. (6) . Similarly, a normal ciphertext (with attributes Γ) is expressed by Eq. (7) . A semi-functional ciphertext is expressed by Eq. (10). A partially randomized semi-functional of type 0 key is expressed by Eqs. (8) and (9) . A partially randomized semifunctional of type j-1 (resp. j-2) key is expressed by Eqs. (8) and (11) (resp. Eqs. (8) and (12)) for non-matching attributes v h,i as well as Eq. (9) for matching attributes v h,i . A semifunctional key is expressed by Eq. (13) for non-matching attributes v h,i as well as Eq. (9) for matching attributes v h,i . A non-functional ciphertext is expressed by Eq. (14) (with c 1 in Eq. (10)).
To prove that the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 is bounded by the advantage of Problem 1 (to guess β ∈ {0, 1}), we construct a simulator of the challenger of Game 0 (or 1) (against an adversary A) by using an instance with β U ← {0, 1} of Problem 1. We then show that the distribution of the secret keys and challenge ciphertext replied by the simulator is equivalent to those of Game 0 when β = 0 and those of Game 1 when β = 1. That is, the advantage of Problem 1 is equivalent to the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 (Lemma 7). The advantage of Problem 1 is proven to be equivalent to twice of that of the DLIN assumption (Lemma 5). Game 2-0-2 is Game 1. Similarly, we show that the advantage gap between Games 2-( j − 1)-2 and 2j-1 for j = 1, . . . , n is equivalent to the advantage of Problem 2 (Lemma 8), and then twice of that of the DLIN assumption (Lemma 6). We then show that Game 2j-1 can be conceptually changed to Game 2j-2 (Lemma 9), by using the fact that parts of bases, b 1,2n+1 , . . . , b 1,3n and b * 1,2n+1 , . . . , b * 1,3n , are unknown to the adversary.
We then show that Game 2-n-2 can be conceptually changed to Game 3 (Lemma 10), by using our modified pairwise independence lemma (Lemma 3) and the informationtheoretical security property of secret sharing. Finally, Game 3 can be conceptually changed to Game 4 (Lemma 11) by using the fact that parts of bases, b 0,2 and b * 0,3 , are unknown to the adversary. In the conceptual change, we use the fact that the challenge ciphertext and all queried keys are semi-functional, i.e., respective coefficients of b 0,2 and b * 0,2 are random.
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we consider the following 2n + 4 games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
For notational simplicity, we use (:= h ) for the number of rows in access matrices of any key queries below.
Game 0 : Original game. That is, the reply to the h-th key query for
The challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintexts (m (0) , m (1) ) and Γ := {x j } is:
← F q and y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ). Game 1 : Same as Game 0 except that the reply to the h-th key query for S h := (M h , ρ h ) is:
The challenge ciphertext is: 
where τ U ← F q , and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0.
. . , n and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-( j−1)-2. Note that since ξ h,1 = 1 (and other ξ h,κ = 0) when j = 0, the above distribution is equivalent to that in Game 1 (= Game 2-0-2).
where Z j U ← H y (n, F q ) T and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2j-1. 
where w h,0 
where ζ
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3.
Adv (4) A (λ) be the advantage of A in Game 0, 1, 2j-ι, 3 and 4, respectively. Adv (0) A (λ) is equivalent to Adv KP-ABE,SA A (λ) and it is clear that Adv (4) A (λ) = 0 by Lemma 12. We will show five lemmas (Lemmas 7-11) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of the advantages in Game 0, . . ., Game 4. From these lemmas and Lemmas 5-3, we obtain Adv KP-ABE,SA
where := (3νˆ +10n+ 11)/q. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemmas
All the proofs of Lemmas in Sect. 6.3, i.e., Lemmas 5-12, are given in Appendix B.
Definition 10 (Problem 1): Problem 1 is to guess β, given
. For a probabilistic adversary C, we define the advantage of C as the quantity
For any adversary C, there exist probabilistic machines F 1 and F 2 , whose running time are essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ,
. For a probabilistic adversary B, the advantage of C for Problem 2, Adv P2 C (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 10.
Lemma 6: For any adversary C, there exist probabilistic machines F 1 and F 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P2
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine C 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine C 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (2- 
Lemma 9: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (2j-1)
Lemma 10: For any adversary A, for any security param-
where ν is the maximum number of A's key queries, andˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices of key queries.
Lemma 11: For any adversary A, for any security param-
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (4) A (λ) = 0.
Key Techniques
One of the aims of the above game changes is that values of shares r h,i for non-matching indices (h, i) (i.e., (ρ
) are made hidden from the adversary as in previous security proofs of ABE.
For achieving it, random matrices Z h,i U ← H y (n, F q ) T are inserted in the hidden (or semi-functional) part of k * h,i for non-matching (h, i).
In high-level description, it is accomplished by the sequence of swaps and information-theoretical (conceptual) changes, similar techniques were used in [41] . Moreover, to generate random Z h,i , we use both of additive and multiplicative structures of H y (n, F q ). For the former (resp. latter), see Sect. 6.4.1 (resp. 6.4.2).
Iteration of Swaps and Conceptual Changes for Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is proven by the hybrid argument through 2n + 4 games (given in Sect. 6.1). First, in Game 0, coefficients of the hidden parts of c 1 and k * h,i (h = 1, . . . , ν; i = 1, . . . , ) are all zero. Then, in the next Game 1, that of c 1 is filled with (τ y, τ y) ∈ F 2n q and the first n-dim. coefficient (block) of the hidden parts of k * h,i
as: (Hereafter, we describe coefficients of the hidden part, i.e., span b 1,n+1 , . . . , b 1,3n (resp. span b * 1,n+1 , . . . , b * 1,3n ) of c 1 (resp. k * h,i for non-matching (h, i)) and a blank indicates zero coefficients)
Coefficients of the hidden part of c 1 in Game 0
Coefficients of the hidden part of c 1 in Game 1 −→ τ y τ y
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * h,i in Game 0
After that, in turn for j = 1, . . . , n, the coefficient vector p h,i · ξ h,i, j I n ∈ F n q is swapped to the second block of the hidden parts of k * h,i (for h = 1, . . . , ν; i = 1, . . . , ) in Game 2j-1 and the coefficient vector is conceptually (informationtheoretically) changed to p h,i · ξ h,i, j Z j in Game 2j-2 by a conceptual basis change. The swap can be securely executed under the DLIN assumption (through Problem 2). In
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * h,i in Game 2j-2
Insertion of Z j is realized by a conceptual basis change determined by Z j and the multiplicative group structure of H y (n, F q ) (see item 2 in Sect. 6.4.2). Moreover, the obtained distribution of vectors p h,i · ( n κ=1 ξ h,i,κ Z κ ) is equivalent to p h,i · Z h,i with Z h,i U ← H y (n, F q ) T , which is shown by using the affine space (i.e., additive) structure of H y (n, F q ) (see item 3 in Sect. 6.4.2).
Hence, in Game 3, the coefficient vector is changed to
and then the secret value r h,0 for decryption are information-theoretically hidden from the adversary for h = 1, . . . , ν. In Game 4, the value of challenge bit b is independent from the adversary's view, and the proof is complete.
Key Properties of H y (n, F q )
In order to achieve the game transformations given above, in particular, change into Game 2j-2, the transformation ( y, v) → ( yU, vZ) by (U, Z) with U U ← H y (n, F q ) and Z := (U −1 ) T is required to satisfy the following conditions. 1. It fixes the target y, i.e., yU = y, since H y (n, F q ) is the isotropy group of y (Lemma 1). If yU was uniformly distributed in a large subspace outside of span y , the challenger would fail the simulation for the above game changes. 2. The fact that H y (n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(n, F q ) (Lemma 1) realizes (iterated) information-theoretical changes into Game 2j-2 since (Z 1 , . . . ,
-dimensional affine space and H n−2 := A n−1 ∩ {u n = 0} is a hyperplane section of A n−1 . This additive structure generates a freshly random element by a linear combination n κ=1 ξ κ Z κ with freshly random ξ κ such that n κ=1 ξ κ = 1 and Z κ
. That is, if y · v 0 and is uniformly random (resp. y · v = 0), vZ distributes uniformly in F n q (resp. in the hyperplane that is perpendicular to y) except for negligible probability.
Lemma 3 is considered to be a pairwise independence lemma specific to H y (n, F q ). For comparison, we describe the lemma for H(n, F q ) in [36] below. Fig. 2 compares the two lemmas when y · v ( 0) is uniformly random and independent from other variables, which is an important case for the security proof of the proposed KP-ABE.
Lemma 13 (Pairwise Independence Lemma for H(n, F q ) [36] ): Let e n := (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ F n q . For all y ∈ F n q \ span e n and π ∈ F q , let W y,π := {( r, w) ∈ (span y, e n \ span e n ) × (F n q \ span e n ⊥ ) | r · w = π}. For all ( y, v) ∈ F n q \ span e n × F n q \ span e n ⊥ and The left hand side of Fig. 2 presents the transformation ( y, v) → ( yU, vZ) which is given in Lemma 13 using a pair of matrices (U, Z) with U U ← H(n, F q )∩GL(n, F q ) in a threedimensional space when y· v ( 0) is uniformly random. The image ( yU, vZ) is spreading over span y, e n × F n q except for negligible probability since ( yU)·( vZ) = y· v is random. The right hand side of Fig. 2 presents the transformation which is given in Lemma 3 using (U, Z) with U U ← H y (n, F q ) in a three-dimensional space when y · v ( 0) is uniformly random. Then, y is fixed, i.e., yU = y. Only vZ is spreading over F n q except for negligible probability since y · ( vZ) = y · v is random. Since y is fixed in this conceptual change, i.e., change to Game 2j-2, we can execute the next computational change, i.e., swap in Game 2-( j+1)-1, in the sequence of changes given in Sect. 6.4.1.
An Alternative Modular Approach
We describe an alternative proof of Theorem 1 using interactive Problem 3, which is defined below. Lemma 14 shows that the advantage of Problem 3 is bounded by 2n-times the advantages of the DLIN problem. In addition, Lemma 15 shows that the advantage gap between Games 0 and 3 (defined in Sect. 6.1) is bounded by the advantage of Problem 3.
High-Level Problem (Problem 3)
In Problem 3, the adversary declares the challenge y in step 2 of the definition. While ciphertext elements (e β,0 and) e β,1 are generated depending on y, key elements h * β,0 and {h * β, j,i } do not depend on any key query S, but can be used for simulation of any key query. Hence, Problem 3 is considered as a "no key query" version semi-adaptive security game that can be used for the scheme's semi-adaptive security. By using the high-level problem, i.e., Problem 3, we improve modularity for the proof of Theorem 1. As an example, Problem 5 in Sect. 7.3.2, a variant of Problem 3, can be seamlessly used for full security proof of the proposed ABS with constantsize secret keys. 2. The adversary gives the target vector y to the challenger. The challenger then generates
, e 0,0 := (ω, 0, 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B 0 , e 1,0 := (ω, τ, 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B 0 , for j = 1, .., n; i = 1, .., n; e i := (0 i−1 , 1, 0 n−i ) ∈ F n q , For any adversary B, there are probabilistic machines F j,ι ( j = 0, . . . , n; ι = 1, 2), whose running times are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P3 B (λ) ≤ n j=0 2 ι=1 Adv DLIN F j,ι (λ) + (10n + 10)/q. The proof of Lemma 14 is given in Appendix C.1.
Proof of Theorem 1 Using Problem 3
To prove Theorem 1 using Problem 3, we only consider 3 games, Game 0 (original semi-adaptive security game), Game 3 and Game 4, which are given in Sect. 6.1.
We will show Lemma 15 that evaluate the gap between Adv (0) A (λ) and Adv (3) A (λ). From the lemma and Lemmas 11 and 14, we obtain Adv KP-ABE
Adv DLIN F j,ι (λ) + (3νˆ + 10n + 10)/q. This completes the proof of Theorem 1 using Problem 3.
Lemma 15: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B, whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
where ν is the maximum number of A's key queries,ˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices of key queries.
The proof of Lemma 15 is given in Appendix C.2.
Iteration of Swaps and Conceptual Changes for
Lemma 14
For comparison of the proofs in Sects. 6.1 and 6.5, we describe the (simple) iteration of swaps and conceptual changes for the proof of Lemma 14 here. Refer to Sect. 6.4.1 for comparison. Lemma 14 is proven by the hybrid argument through 2n + 2 experiments (given in Appendix C.1): Experiment 0 ⇒ Experiment 1 ⇒ for j = 1, . . . , n; Experiment 2j-1 ⇒ Experiment 2j-2
First, in a β = 0 instance of Problem 3 (Experiment 0), coefficients of the hidden parts of e 1 and h * κ,i (κ = 1, . . . , n) are all zero. Then, in the next Experiment 1, that of e 1 is filled with (τ y, τ y) ∈ F 2n q and the first n-dim. coefficient (block) of the hidden parts of h * κ,i (κ = 1, . . . , n) are changed to ρ e i ∈ F n q as: (Hereafter, a blank indicates zero coefficients)
Coefficients of the hidden part of e 1 in Experiment 0
Coefficients of the hidden part of e 1 in Experiment 1
−→ τ y τ y
Coefficients of the hidden part of h * κ,i in Experiment 0
Coefficients of the hidden
After that, in turn for j = 1, . . . , n, the coefficient vector ρ e i ∈ F n q is swapped to the second block of the hidden parts of h * j,i in Experiment 2j-1 and the coefficient vector is conceptually (information-theoretically) changed to ρ e i Z j in Experiment 2j-2 by a conceptual basis change. The swap can be securely executed under the DLIN assumption. At the final Experiment 2-n-2, each ρ e i Z j ( j = 1, . . . , n) is embedded in the second block of hidden parts in h * j,i , i.e., an instance of Experiment 2-n-2 is equivalent to a β = 1 instance of Problem 3. 
Coefficients of the hidden part of h
Insertion of Z j is realized by a conceptual basis change determined by Z j (see item 2 in Sect. 6.4.2).
Proposed Fully Secure ABS Scheme with Constant-Size Secret Keys
We propose a fully secure (adaptive-predicate unforgeable and private) ABS scheme with constant-size secret keys. The ABS scheme is based on the CP-ABE scheme with constant-size secret keys, which is given in Appendix D.2.
The CP-ABE is the dual form of the KP-ABE in Sect. 5.3. While the underlying CP-ABE is only proven that it has non-adaptive payload-hiding security (Theorem 4 in Appendix D.2) † , the weak security of the CP-ABE is enough to prove adaptive-predicate unforgeability of our ABS below.
7.1 Building Blocks for the Proposed ABS
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G ABS ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed ABS scheme.
,...,6;l=1,...,n denotes non-zero entries of X 1 as in Eq. (3), for t = 0, 2, b * t,i := (χ t,i,1 G, .., χ t,i,N t G) for i = 1, .., N t , B * t := (b * t,1 , .., b * t,N t ), B * i, j := µ i, j G, B * i, j,l := µ i, j,l G for i, j = 1, .., 6; l = 1, .., n, for t = 0, 1, 2, (ϑ t,i, j ) i, j=1,...,N t := ψ · (X T t ) −1 , b t,i := (ϑ t,i,1 G, .., ϑ t,i,N t G) for i = 1, .., N t , † Non-adaptive security of CP-ABE means that the adversary's key queries may not depend on the challenge ciphertext [42] . See Defintion 19 in Appendix D.1.
..,6 l=1,...,n , B 2 , B * 2 ).
Remark 5: From Remark 3, {B * i, j , B * i, j,l } i, j=1,...,6;l=1,...,n is identified with basis B * 1 := (b * 1,1 , . . . , b * 1,6n ) dual to B 1 .
Collision Resistant (CR) Hash Functions
Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter. A collision resistant (CR) hash function family, H, associated with G bpg and a polynomial, poly(·), specifies two items:
• A family of key spaces indexed by λ. Each such key space is a probability space on bit strings denoted by KH λ . There must exist a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm whose output distribution on input 1 λ is equal to KH λ . 
Construction
Setup(1 λ , n) : (param n , B 0 , B * 0 , B 1 , {B * i, j , B * i, j,l } i, j=1,...,6 l=1,...,n ,
. KeyGen(pk, sk, Γ := {x 1 , . . . , x n | x j ∈ F × q }) : y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) s.t. n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ), ω, ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2,1,1 , ϕ 2,1,2 , ϕ 2,2,1 , ϕ 2,2,2 U ← F q , k * 0 := (ω, 0, ϕ 0 , 0) B * 0 , L * 1, j := ωB * 1, j + ϕ 1 B * 4, j , L * 2, j := n l=1 y l (ωB * 1, j,l + ϕ 1 B * 4, j,l ) for j = 1, . . . , 6, k * 2,1 := (ω(1, 0), 0, 0, ϕ 2,1,1 , ϕ 2,1,2 , 0) B * 2 , k * 2,2 := (ω(0, 1), 0, 0, ϕ 2,2,1 , ϕ 2,2,2 , 0) B * 2 , return sk Γ := (Γ, k * 0 , {L * 1, j , L * 2, j } j=1,...,6 , {k * 2,ι } ι=1,2 ).
Remark From {L * 1, j , L * 2, j } j=1,...,6 and y, k * 1 is defined as k * 1 := ( n y 1 L * 1,1 , .., y n−1 L * 1,1 , L * 2,1 , n y 1 L * 1,2 , .., y n−1 L * 1,2 , L * 2,2 , · · · y 1 L * 1,5 , .., y n−1 L * 1,5 , L * 2,5 , y 1 L * 1,6 , .., y n−1 L * 1,6 , L * 2,6 ), that is, k * 1 = ( n ω y, 2n 0 2n , n ϕ 1 y, 2n 0 2n ) B * 1 , Sig(pk, sk Γ , m, S := (M, ρ)) : If S := (M, ρ) accepts Γ := {x j } j=1,...,n , then compute y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ), I and {α i } i∈I such that i∈I α i M i = 1, and
where r * 
Security
Theorem 2: The proposed ABS scheme is perfectly private.
Theorem 2 is proven in a similar manner to Theorem 1 in the full version of [38] (privacy of the ABS scheme in [38] ). For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines F 0 , . . . , F 4 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
is the maximum number of A's reveal key (resp. signature) queries,ˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices M of reveal signature queries, and := (6ν Kˆ + 20ν K n + 10ν K + 10ν S + 5)/q.
Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we consider the following 2ν K + ν S + 3 games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates positions of coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
For notational simplicity, we use (:= h ) for the number of rows in access matrices of any reveal signature queries below.
Game 0 : Original game. That is, the reply to a reveal key query for Γ := {x j } j=1,...,n is: 1, 0) , 0, 0, ϕ 2,1,1 , ϕ 2,1,2 , 0) B * 2 , k * 2,2 := (ω(0, 1), 0, 0, ϕ 2,2,1 , ϕ 2,2,2 , 0) B * 2 ,
where ω, ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2,1,1 , . . . , ϕ 2,2,2 U ← F q , and y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ). The reply to a reveal signature query for (m, S) with S := (M, ρ) are:
where, δ
The verification text for (m , S ) with S := (M, ρ) is:
q , e 1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ F n q , and v i := (v n−1 i , . . . , v i , 1) ∈ F n q . Game 1 : Same as Game 0 except that the verification text for (m , S ) with S := (M, ρ) is:
where g U ← F r q , r T := (r 1 , . . . , r ) T := M · g T , r 0 :
q , and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0. 20), and the components k * 1 , k * 2,1 and k * 2,2 of the reply to the h-th reveal key query for Γ is given by Eq. (16) (and k * 0 is given by Eq. (22) ). all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1. 
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-(h − 1). Game 4 : Same as Game 3-ν S except that c 0 generated in Ver for verifying the output of the adversary is:
where s 0 U ← F q (i.e., independent from all the other variables) and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-ν S .
Let Adv (0) A (λ), Adv (λ) and it is obtained that Adv (4) A (λ) = 1/q by Lemma 24. We will show five lemmas (Lemmas 19-23) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of subsequent games. From these lemmas and Lemmas 6-16, we obtain
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemmas
We will show Lemmas 16-24 for the proof of Theorem 3. The proofs of the lemmas except for Lemma 17 are given in Appendix E.
Definition 13 (Problem 4): Problem 4 is to guess β, given 6, n) ,
is calculated as in Eq. (5) from {B * i, j , B * i, j,l } i, j=1,...,6;l=1,...,n ,
, e 0,0 := (δ, 0, 0, δ 0 ) B 0 , e 1,0 := (δ, ρ, 0, δ 0 ) B 0 , for i = 1, . . . , n; e i := (0 i −1 , 1, 0 
. . . , n; i = 1, . . . , n; Lemma 17: For any adversary B, there are probabilistic machines F 0 , F , whose running times are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
Lemma 17 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 14.
Definition 15 (Problem 6): Problem 6 is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given (param n ,
. For a probabilistic machine B, the advantage of B for Problem 6, Adv P6 B (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 10.
Lemma 18: For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine F , whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P6
Lemma 19: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 0 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
. Lemma 20: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, ·) andˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices of reveal signature queries.
Lemma 21: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, ·) andˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices of reveal signature queries.
Lemma 22: For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines B 3 and F 4 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3- Lemma 2 H y (n, F q ) has a linear structure as H y (n, F q ) A n−1 \ H n−2 , where A n−1 := { u ∈ F n q | y· u = y n } is an (n−1)dimensional affine space and H n−2 := A n−1 ∩ {u n = 0} is a hyperplane section of A n−1 .
For all (Z κ ∈ H y (n, F q ) T ) κ=1,...,n such that ( Z κ := Z κ − Z 1 ) κ=2,...,n is a basis of linear subspace V n−1 := { u ∈ F n q | y · u = 0} over F q , the distribution of Z := n κ=1 ξ κ Z κ with (ξ κ ) U ← {(ξ κ ) κ=1,...,n : n κ=1 ξ κ = 1} is equivalent to uniform one, i.e., Z U ← H y (n, F q ) T except with negligible probability 1/q.
Proof. It is directly verified that H y (n, F q ) has a linear struc-ture as H y (n, F q )
..,n is a basis of V n−1 and ξ κ for κ = 2, . . . , n are independently and uniformly distributed in F q , Z given by Eq. (A· 1) is uniformly distributed in affine space A n−1 . Moreover, Z is outside of H n−2 except with probability 1/q, hence, uniformly distributed in H y (n, F q ) T except with negligible probability 1/q.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 For all y ∈ F n q \ span e n and π ∈ F q , let W y,π := { w ∈ F n q \ span e n ⊥ | y · w = π}, where span e n ⊥ :
and u := (u 1 , . . . , u n ). Note that u · y = y n . For y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) and v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ) with v n 0, let
where u j := u n (v j v −1 n )−u j for j = 1, . . . , n−1 and y n := y· u . Then,
Case that y · u 0 : Since y· v 0, u can be generated as:
( u 1 , . . . , u n−1 ) U ← {( u j ) j=1,...,n−1 ∈ F n−1 q | n−1 j=1 y j u j + y n 0}, u n := v n ( n−1 j=1 y j u j + y n )/( y · v), and u j := u n (v j v −1 n ) − u j for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. We note that the condition n−1 j=1 y j u j + y n 0 among u j ( j = 1, . . . , n − 1) is equivalent to the condition u n 0.
Since ( u 1 , .., u n−1 ) U ← {( u j ) j=1,..,n−1 ∈ F n−1 q | n−1 j=1 y j u j + y n 0} and u n := v n ( n−1 j=1 y j u j + y n )/( y · v), w := u n −1 v n · ( u 1 , . . . , u n−1 , 1) is uniformly distributed in W y,( y· v) .
Case that y · u = 0 : Since y · v = 0, Eq. (A· 2) is given as n−1 j=1 y j u j +y n = 0. Since y span e n , there exists an index j 0 ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that y j 0 0. Using the index j 0 , u can be generated as: u j U ← F q ( j = 1, . . . , j 0 −1, j 0 +1, . . . , n− 1), u j 0 := (− j=1,..., j 0 −1, j 0 +1,n−1 y j u j − y n )/y j 0 , u n U ← F × q and u j := u n (v j v −1 n ) − u j for j = 1, .., n − 1. Since ( u 1 , .., u n−1 ) U ← {( u j ) j=1,..,n−1 ∈ F n−1 q | n−1 j=1 y j u j + y n = 0} and u n U ← F × q , w := u n −1 v n · ( u 1 , . . . , u n−1 , 1) is uniformly distributed in W y,0 .
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas in Sect. 6.3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 For any adversary C, there exist probabilistic machines F 1 and F 2 , whose running time are essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ,
Lemma 5 is proven in a similar manner to Lemmas 1 and 2 in [3] .
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 For any adversary C, there are probabilistic machines F 1 , F 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ,
Proof. To prove Lemma 6, we use an intermediate problem, Basic Problems 1, as indicated below.
Definition 16 (Basic Problem 1): Basic Problem 1 is to guess β, given (param n , B 0 , B * 0 , e 0 ,
(1 λ , 6, n), Lemma 25: For any adversary C, there are probabilistic machine D 1 and D 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P2 C (λ) ≤ Adv BP1 D 1 (λ) + Adv BP1 D 2 (λ). Lemma 26: For any adversary D, there is a probabilistic machine F , whose running time is essentially the same as that of D, such that for any security parameter λ,
From Lemmas 25 and 26, we obtain Lemma 6.
Below, we give proofs of Lemmas 25 and 26 in turn.
Proof of Lemma 25
To prove Lemma 25, we consider the following experiments. Problem 3 is the hybrid of the following Experiments 0, . . . , 3, i.e., Adv P2
Therefore, from Lemmas 27-29, we obtain Lemma 25.
For a probabilistic adversary C, we define Experiment 0, Exp 0 C , using Problem P2 generator G P2 0 (1 λ , n) in Definition 11 as follows:
Based on Experiment 0, we define Experiments 0-3 below. In Experiment 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent experiment. In the other experiments, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in an experiment from the previous one. where θ U ← F q , and all the other variables are generated as in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3 (Exp 3
C ) : Same as Experiment 2 except that
where all variables are generated as in Experiment 2.
Lemma 27: For any adversary C, there exists a probabilistic machine D 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ,
and f * i := ρb * 1,n+i for i = 1, . . . , 2n. D 1 then gives :=
..,n ) to C, and outputs β ∈ {0, 1} if C outputs β . When β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the distribution of is exactly same as that of instances in Experiment 0 (resp. Experiment 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 27.
Lemma 28: For any adversary C, for any security parameter λ,
Lemma 29: For any adversary C, there exists a probabilistic machine D 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ,
Proof. Lemma 29 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 27.
Proof of Lemma 26
To prove Lemma 26, we use an intermediate problem, Basic Problems 2, as indicated below.
Definition 17 (Basic Problem 2): Basic Problem 2 is to guess β, given (param n , B 0 ,
(1 λ , 6, n),
. For a probabilistic adversary E, the advantage of E for Basic Problem 2, Adv BP2 E (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 10.
Lemma 30: For any adversary D, there is a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of D, such that for any security parameter λ,
..,n ), E calculates τ U ← F q , e 0 := τb 0,2 , e i := τb 1,2n+i
for i = 1, . . . , n and B 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , b 1,3n+1 , . . . , b 1,6n ). E defines new dual orthonormal bases D 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,2n , d 1,2n+1 , . . . , d 1,3n , b 1,3n+1 , . . . , b 1,6n ) and 6n ) , where d 1,2n+i := b 1,2n+i −b 1,n+i and d * 1,n+i := b * 1,n+i +b * 1,2n+i for i = 1, . . . , n. We note that D 1 is compatible with subbasis B 1 . E then gives := (param n , B 0 , B * 0 , e 0 , B 1 , D * 1 , {h * β,i , e i } i=1,...,n ) to D, and outputs β ∈ {0, 1} if D outputs β .
(h * 0,i , h * 1,i , e i ) are expressed over bases (B 1 , B * 1 ) and (D 1 , D * 1 ) as
Therefore, when β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the distribution of is exactly same as that of instances from G BP1 0 (resp. G BP1 1 ). This completes the proof of Lemma 30.
Lemma 31: For any adversary E, there is a probabilistic machine F , whose running time is essentially the same as that of E, such that for any security parameter λ,
Lemma 31 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 4 in the full version of [36] .
B.3 Proofs of Lemmas 7-12
Lemma 7 For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine C 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (0)
Lemma 7 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 4 in [3] . Note that the simulator (challenger) provides A a part of the given Problem 1 instance as a public key pk := (1 λ , param n , { B t } t=0,1 ), which is independent from the target y.
Lemma 8 For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine C 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (2-( j−1)-2)
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 8, we construct a probabilistic machine C 2 against Problem 2 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 2-( j − 1)-2 or 2j-1) as a black box as follows:
1. C 2 is given an index j and a Problem 2 instance, (param n , B 0 , B * 0 , f * 0 , e 0 , B 1 ,
..,n ). 2. C 2 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 3. C 2 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param n , { B t } t=0,1 ) of Game 2-( j − 1)-2 (and 2j-1), where B 0 := (b 0,1 , b 0,3 , b 0,5 ) and B 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , b 1,5n+1 , . . . ,  b 1,6n ) , that are obtained from the Problem 2 instance. 4. Then, C 2 (or challenger) obtains challenge attributes Γ with Γ := {x 1 , . . . , x n }, and C 2 calculates y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 i=0 y n−i z i = z n−1−n · n i=1 (z− x i ). C 2 generates Z κ := (χ κ,ι,l ) ι,l U ← H y (n, F q ) T for κ = 1, . . . , j − 1. 5. For h = 1, . . . , ν, when the h-th key query is issued for
and answers as follows: C 2 calculates k * 0 as given in Eq. (8) using B * 0 of the Problem 2 instance and s h,0 , r h,0 above, and the i-th component,
where k * norm 
where ω, ζ, ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 U ← F q , and (e 0 , {e ι } ι=1,...,n ), B 0 , B 1 are a part of the Problem 2 instance. 7. When a key query is issued by A after the encryption query, C 2 executes the same procedure as that of step 5. 8. A finally outputs bit b . If b = b , C 2 outputs β := 1.
Otherwise, C 2 outputs β := 0.
When β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A is equivalent to that in Game 2-( j − 1)-2 (resp. 2j-1). This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 9
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (2j-1)
A (λ). Proof. To prove Lemma 9, we will show distribution (param n , { B t } t=0,1 , {sk ( j) * S } j=1,...,ν , ct Γ ) in Games 2j-1 and 2j-2 are equivalent. For that purpose, we define new subbases d 1,2n+1 , . . . , d 1,3n and d * 1,2n+1 , . . . , d * 1,3n of V 1 as follows: For the target vector y, we generate U U ← H y (n, F q ). Then, let Z := (U −1 ) T . We note that y · U = y. Then we set (d 1,2n+1 , . . . , d 1,3n ) T := Z · (b 1,2n+1 , . . . , b 1,3n ) T and (d * 1,2n+1 , . . . , d * 1,3n ) T := U · (b * 1,2n+1 , . . . , b * 1,3n ) T and 
κ=1 ξ κ = 1 ∧ ξ n+1 = 0 if j = n}, and Z κ := Z κ Z for κ = 1, . . . , j − 1, Z j := Z are independently and uniformly distributed in H y (n, F q ) T since Z κ , Z U ← H y (n, F q ) T . Therefore, the distribution (param n , { D t } t=0,1 , {sk ( j) * S } j=1,...,ν , ct Γ ) is equivalent to that in Game 2j-2. This completes the proof of Lemma 9.
Lemma 10 For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv (2-n-2) 
..,n ∈ F n q | n κ=1 ξ κ = 1}, and Z κ U ← H y (n, F q ) T for κ = 1, . . . , n. We note that { Z κ := Z κ − Z 1 } κ=2,...,n (given by { u κ := (u κ,1 , . . . , u κ,n ) ∈ F n q } κ=2,...,n ) are linearly independent except that the matrix ( u κ ) κ=2,...,n ∈ F (n−1)×n q does not have maximal rank n − 1, i.e., except for probability 1/q. Therefore, from Lemma 2, since (ξ h,i,κ ) κ=1,...,n are freshly random for each key component indexed by (h, i) and n κ=1 ξ h,i,κ = 1, each Z h,i := n κ=1 ξ h,i,κ Z κ in the hidden subspace is freshly random except with negligible probability 1/q. Therefore, k * h,i are distributed as
where Z h,i are freshly random (except with negligible probability).
From Lemma 3, w h,i := p h,i · Z h,i are distributed as
with negligible probability 1/q, i.e., k * h,i are distributed as in Eq. (13) . The corresponding shares r h,i are information-theoretically hidden from the adversary A. Also, r h,i obtained from the other indices i for the h-th key query are independent from a central secret r h,0 . From this independence, Game 2-n-2 can be conceptually changed to Game 3, i.e., k * h,0 are distributed as in Eq. (13) . This completes the proof of Lemma 10.
Lemma 11
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3) A (λ) − Adv (4) A (λ)| ≤ 1/q. Proof. Lemma 11 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 7 in [3] . For completeness, we give the proof below.
To prove Lemma 11, we will show distribution (param n , { B t } t=0,1 , {sk S h } h=1,...,ν , ct Γ ) in Game 3 and that in Game 4 are equivalent, where sk S h is the answer to the h-th key query, and ct Γ is the challenge ciphertext. By definition, we only need to consider elements on V 0 or V * 0 . We define new bases D 0 of V 0 and D * 0 of V * 0 as follows: We generate θ 
In the light of the adversary's view, both (B 0 , B * 0 ) and (D 0 , D * 0 ) are consistent with public key pk := (1 λ , param n , { B t } t=0,1 ). Therefore, {sk S h } h=1,...,ν and ct Γ can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Game 3 over bases (B 0 , B * 0 ) and in Game 4 over bases (D 0 , D * 0 ). Thus, Game 3 can be conceptually changed to Game 4 if τ 0, i.e., except with probability 1/q.
Lemma 12
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (4) A (λ) = 0. Proof. The value of b is independent from the adversary's view in Game 4. Hence, Adv (4) A (λ) = 0.
Appendix C: Proofs of Lemmas in Sect. 6.5
C.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Lemma 14 Problem 3 is computationally intractable under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine F , whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
To prove Lemma 14, we consider the following 2n + 3 experiments. For a probabilistic adversary B, we define Experiment 0, Exp 0 B , using Problem 3 generator (or challenger) in Definition 12 as follows:
1. B is given the first part of a P3 instance 1 given in step 1 in Definition 12. 2. B outputs the target y to the challenger, and is given the second part of a P3 instance 2 given in step 2 in Definition 12.
Based on Experiment 0, we define the other experiments below.
In Experiment 0, a part framed by a box indicates positions of coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
Experiment 0 (Exp 0 B ) : Experiment 0 is defined by using β = 0 instance of Problem 3 as above. That is, δ, δ 0 , ω, ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 U ← F q , τ, ρ U ← F × q , and h * 0 := (δ, 0 , 0, δ 0 , 0) B * 0 , e 0 := (ω, 0 , 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B 0 , for j = 1, . . . , n; i = 1, . . . , n;
Below, we describe coefficients of the hidden part, i.e., span b 1,n+1 , . . . , b 1,3n (resp. span b * 1,n+1 , . . . , b * 1,3n ) of e 1 (resp. h * κ,i ) w.r.t. these bases vectors for κ = 1, . . . , n. Nonzero coefficients are colored by light gray, and those which were changed from the previous experiment are colored by dark gray. h * 0 := (δ, ρ , 0, δ 0 , 0) B * 0 , e 0 := (ω, τ , 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B 0 , for j = 1, . . . , n; i = 1, . . . , n; 
where all the other variables are generated as in Game 2j-1.
Coefficients of the hidden part of e 1 in Exp. 
Adv DLIN F j,ι (λ) + (10n + 10)/q. This completes the proof of Lemma 14.
Lemma 32: For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine C 0 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
Proof. C 0 is given a P1 instance (param n , {B ι , B * ι } ι=0,1 , {h * β,i , e β,i } i=0,...,n ) and a target vector y. C 0 then calculates (param n , { B ι , B * ι } ι=0,1 ) in Experiment 0, and calculates e 0 := e β,0 , e 1 := n ι=1 y ι e β,ι , h * 0 := h * β,0 , {h *
..,n , e 1 ) to B. C 0 outputs β ∈ {0, 1} if B outputs β . The distribution of is equivalent to that in Experiment 0 (resp. 1) when β is 0 (resp. 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 32.
Lemma 33: For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine C, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
..,n ), a target vector y and an index j. C then calculates (param n , { B ι , B * ι } ι=0,1 , h * 0 := δb * 0,1 + f * 0 + δ 0 b * 0,5 , e 0 := ωb 0,1 + e 0 + ϕ 0 b 0,5 , e 1 := n ι=1 y ι (ωb 1,ι 
and sends := (param n , { B ι , B * ι } ι=0,1 , h * 0 , e 0 , {h * j,i } j=1,...,n i=1,...,n , e 1 ) to B. C outputs β ∈ {0, 1} if B outputs β . The distribution of is equivalent to that in Experiment 2-( j − 1)-2 (resp. 2j-1) when β is 0 (resp. 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 33. 
where Z j := Z and {Z κ := Z κ · Z} κ< j are independently and uniformly distributed in H y (n, F q ) T since H y (n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(n, F q ) (Lemma 1). Since y · U = y, e 1 has the same representations over both B 1 and D 1 .
Therefore, the distribution of (param n , { B ι , B * ι } ι=0,1 , h * 0 , e 0 , {h * j,i } j=1,...,n; i=1,...,n , e 1 ) in Experiments 2j-1 and 2j-2 are equivalent. This completes the proof of Lemma 34.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 15
Lemma 15 For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B, whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (0)
A (λ)| ≤ Adv P3 B (λ) + 3νˆ /q, where ν is the maximum number of A's key queries,ˆ is the maximum number of rows in access matrices of key queries.
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 15, we construct a probabilistic machine B against Problem 3 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 0 or 3) as a black box as follows:
1. B is given the first part of a Problem 3 instance, which is given in step 1 in Definition 12, (param n , { B ι , B * ι } ι=0,1 ). 2. B plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 3. B provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param n , { B t } t=0,1 ) of Game 2-( j − 1)-2 (and 2j-1), where B 0 := (b 0,1 , b 0,3 , b 0,5 ) and B 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , b 1,5n+1 , . . . , b 1,6n ), that are obtained from the Problem 3 instance. 4. When B (or challenger) obtains challenge attributes Γ with Γ := {x 1 , . . . , x n } in the first step of the game, B calculates y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ), and gives y to the challenger of Problem 3. Then, B is given the second part of the Problem 3 instance, which is given in step 2 in Definition 12, (h * β,0 , e β,0 , {h * β, j,i } j=1,...,n; i=1,...,n , e β,1 ). 5. For h = 1, . . . , ν, when the h-th key query is issued for When β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A is equivalent to that in Game 0 (resp. 3) except with negligible probability 3νˆ /q (see the proof of Lemma 10). This completes the proof of Lemma 15.
Appendix D: The Underlying CP-ABE for the Proposed ABS in Sect. 7
D.1 Definitions
Our definition of CP-ABE is the dual form of our KP-ABE given in Definition 5. Setup takes as input security parameter 1 λ and a bound on the number of attributes per ciphertext n. It outputs public parameters pk and master secret key sk. KeyGen takes as input public parameters pk, master secret key sk, and a set of attributes, Γ := {x j } 1≤ j≤n . It outputs a corresponding secret key sk Γ . Enc takes as input public parameters pk, message m in some associated message space msg, and access structure S := (M, ρ). It outputs a ciphertext ct S . Dec takes as input public parameters pk, secret key sk Γ for a set of attributes Γ, and ciphertext ct S that was encrypted under access structure S. It outputs either m ∈ msg or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
The correctness of CP-ABE is standard and similarly defined as that for KP-ABE.
Definition 19 (Non-Adaptive Security [42] ): The model for defining the (indistinguishability game-based) non-adaptively payload-hiding security (in [42] ) of CP-ABE under chosen plaintext attack is given by the following game:
Setup In the non-adaptive security, the challenger runs the setup, (pk, sk) R ← Setup(1 λ , n), and gives public parameters pk to the adversary. Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of key queries, Γ, to the challenger.
The challenger gives sk Γ R ← KeyGen(pk, sk, Γ) to the adversary. Challenge The adversary submits two messages m (0) , m (1) and a challenge access structure, S. provided that no Γ queried to the challenger in Phase 1 is accepted by S. We note that the adversary is not allowed to issue any key query after the challenge phase in the above nonadaptive game.
D.2 Construction and Security
We first give the orthonormal basis generator for the CP-ABE below.
..,6 l=1,...,n ). We give our CP-ABE with constant-size secret keys below. We note that attributes x j , v i are in F × q , i.e., nonzero. = (b 1,1 , .., b 1,n , b 1,4n+1 , .., b 1,6n ) ,
KeyGen(pk, sk, Γ := {x 1 , . . . ,
y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) s.t. n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ), k * 0 := (ω, 0, 1, ϕ 0 , 0) B * 0 , L * 1, j := ωB * 1, j + ϕ 1 B * 4, j , L * 2, j := n l=1 y l (ωB * 1, j,l + ϕ 1 B * 4, j,l ) for j = 1, . . . , 6, return sk Γ := (Γ, k * 0 , {L * 1, j , L * 2, j } j=1,...,6 ). Remark From {L * 1, j , L * 2, j } j=1,...,6 and y, k * 1 is defined as k * 1 := ( n y 1 L * 1,1 , .., y n−1 L * 1,1 , L * 2,1 , n y 1 L * 1,2 , .., y n−1 L * 1,2 , L * 2,2 , · · · y 1 L * 1,5 , .., y n−1 L * 1,5 , L * 2,5 , y 1 L * 1,6 , .., y n−1 L * 1,6 , L * 2,6 ), 
y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ) s.t. n−1 j=0 y n− j z j = z n−1−n · n j=1 (z − x j ), (C 1 , . . . , C 6n ) := i∈I ∧ ρ(i)=v i
E j := n−1 l=1 y l C ( j−1)n+l for j = 1, . . . , 6, K := e(c 0 , k * 0 ) · 6 j=1 e(E j , L * 1, j ) · e(C jn , L * 2, j ) , return m := c T /K.
Theorem 4:
The above CP-ABE scheme is non-adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines F 0 , . . . , F 4 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
where F l-h-0 (·) := F l (h, 0, ·), F l-h-j-ι (·) := F l (h, j, ι, ·) for l = 1, 2, ν K is the maximum number of A's key queries, and is a negligible function in λ.
Proof Sketch. Theorem 4 is proven through a part of games for Theorem 3, i.e., Games 0, 1, 2-h-1 and 2-h-2 (h = 1, . . . , ν K ) in Sect. 7.3.1. The differences between ABS and CP-ABE are that the verification text for ABS corresponds to the challenge ciphertext for CP-ABE, only two spaces {V t } t=0,1 are used in CP-ABE (not three spaces as in the case of ABS), and the dimension of V 0 in CP-ABE is five (not four as in the case of ABS). In Game 2-ν K -2, we have secret keys k * h,0 := (ω h , τ h , 1, ϕ 0,h , 0) B * 0 for h = 1, . . . , ν K and the challenge ciphertext c 0 := (−s 0 , −r 0 , ζ, 0, η 0 ) B 0 where τ h U ← F q , g U ← F r q , r 0 := 1 · g T . Therefore, we consider Game 3 for our CP-ABE as: where ζ U ← F q (i.e., independent from ζ U ← F q ), and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν K -2.
We can prove the following facts as in Lemmas 11 and 12: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv Proof. Lemma 16 is proven through hierarchical (security) reductions for sparse DPVS which are developed in [36] . Lemma 16 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 4 in the full version of [36] , while the size of ciphertexts is small in [36] but the size of keys (and sgnatures) is small here. For completeness, we give the proof of Lemma 16 below. We first define Basic Problem 0 as in Definition 10 in [36] . Lemma 35 is proven in the full version of [3] . Therefore, the proof of Lemma 16 is reduced to that of the following Lemma 36, in which the matrix group P(6, n, F q ) (Eq. (3)) has an important role.
Lemma 36: For any machine C, there is a probabilistic machine D, whose running time is essentially the same as that of C, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P4 C (λ) ≤ Adv BP0 D (λ).
Proof.
D is given a Basic Problem 0 instance (param BP0 , B, B * , y * β , f , κG, ξG). D generates random linear transformation defined by matrices W 0 U ← GL(4, F q ) on G 4 , W 1 g 0,0 = (y * 0 , 0)W 0 + η 0 d 0,4 = (δ, 0, 0, δ 0 ) D 0 , g 1,0 = (y * 1 , 0)W 0 + η 0 d 0,4 = (δ, ρ, 0, δ 0 ) D 0 , with δ 0 := σ + η 0 , and g β,i (i = 1, . . . , n) are expressed over bases P 1 and D 1 as g 0,i = (0 6(i−1) , y * 0 , 0 3 , 0 6(n−i) )W 1 + η i = (0 6(i−1) , δ, 0, 0 3 , σ, 0 6(n−i) ) P 1 + η i = ( n δ e i , 2n 0 2n , n 0 n , 2n δ i ) D 1 , where δ i U ← F 2n q , g 1,i = (0 6(i−1) , y * 1 , 0 3 , 0 6(n−i) )W 1 + η i = (0 4(i−1) , δ, ρ, 0 3 , σ, 0 4(n−i) ) P 1 + η i = ( n δ e i , 2n ρ e i , 0 n , n 0 n ,
g β,n+1 is expressed over basis D 2 and D 2 as g 0,n+1 = (y * 0 , 0 4 )W 2 + η n+1 d 2,7 = (δ, 0, 0, 0 3 , δ n+1 ) D 2 = (δ, 0, 0, 0 3 , δ n+1 ) D 2 g 1,n+1 = (y * 1 , 0 4 )W 2 + η n+1 d 2,7 = (δ, 0, ρ, 0 3 , δ n+1 ) D 2 , = (δ, 0, ψ, 0 2 , δ n+1 ) D 2 , with δ n+1 := σ + η n+1 . Here, two-dimensional vector (ρ, 0) is changed to random ψ by the basis change from D 2 to D 2 .
Here, δ, ρ, δ 0 , δ i , and δ n+1 are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, the distribution of (param n , {D t , D * t } t=0,1 , D 2 , D * 2 , {g β,i } i=0,...,n+1 ) is exactly the same as 
E.2 Proofs of Lemmas 18-24
Lemma 18 For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine F , whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P6 B (λ) ≤ Adv DLIN F (λ) + 5/q.
Proof.
A Problem 6 instance is given as (param n , { B t , B * t } t=0,2 , B 1 , B * 1 , h * β,0 , e 0 , {h * 1,i } i=1,..,n , {h * β,2,i , e 2,i } i=1,2 ). Note that the sparse DPVS technique is employed only to the first vector space V 1 . Hence, we decompose the instance into two parts, standard (non-sparse) DPVS elements and sparse DPVS ones.
The former one is ({ B t , B * t } t=0,2 , h * β,0 , e 0 , {h * β,2,i , e 2,i } i=1,2 ), and this is an Problem 2 instance in [3] (Definition 5) with d = 1, n 1 = 2. The Problem 2 in [3] is reduced from Basic Problem 0 (in Definition 20) .
The latter part is (B 1 , B * 1 , {h * 1,i } i=1,..,n ) where h * 1,i := δb * 1,i . Since a Basic Problem 0 instance includes κG, ξG, δξG (which are also included in DLIN instances), we can simulate all the sparse part, {h * 1,i } i=1,..,n , as well as B 1 , B * 1 just from κG, ξG, δξG.
Consequently, we can simulate both parts from a Basic Problem 0 instance, and then we have Adv P6 C (λ) ≤ Adv BP0 D (λ) ≤ Adv DLIN E (λ) + 5/q. This completes the proof of Lemma 18.
Lemma 19
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 0 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (0) A (λ)− Adv (1)
A (λ)| ≤ Adv P4 B 0 (λ).
5 instance, which is given in step 1 in Definition 14, (param n , B 0 , B * 0 , B 1 , B * 1 , B 2 , B * 2 ). 2. B 1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 3. B 1 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , hk, param n , { B t } t=0,1,2 ) of Game 2-(h−1)-2 (and 2-h-1), where hk (b 0,1 , d 0,2 , b 0,3 , b 0,4 ) and D * 0 := (d * 0,1 , b * 0,2 , b * 0,3 , b * 0,4 ). Then, D 0 and D * 0 are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as the original bases, B 0 and B * 0 . The V 0 components {k ( j) * 0 } j=1,...,ν K in keys, {s ( j) * 0 } j=1,...,ν S in signatures, and verification text c 0 in Game 3ν S are expressed over bases B 0 and B * 0 as k ( j) * 0 = (ω ( j) , τ ( j) 0 , ϕ ( j) 0 , 0) B * 0 , s ( j) * 0 = ( δ ( j) , π ( j) 0 , σ ( j) 0 , 0) B * 0 and c 0 = (−s 0 − s +1 , −r 0 − r +1 , 0, η 0 ) B 0 . Then,
where ϑ ( j) := τ ( j) 0 + θω ( j) which are uniformly, independently distributed since τ ( j)
where ϑ ( j) := π ( j) 0 + θ δ ( j) which are uniformly, independently distributed since π ( j) . Therefore, {sk ( j) Γ } j=1,...,ν K , { s ( j) * } j=1,...,ν S , and c can be expressed as keys, signatures, and verification text in two ways, in Game 3-ν S over bases {B t , B * t } t=0,1,2 and in Game 4 over bases D 0 , D * 0 , {B t , B * t } t=1,2 . Thus, Game 3-ν S can be conceptually changed to Game 4 if −r 0 − r +1 0, i.e., except with probability 1/q.
Lemma 24
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (4) A (λ) = 1/q. Lemma 24 is proven in a manner similar to Lemma 18 in the full version of [38] . For completeness, we give the proof of Lemma 24 below.
Proof. Let (s * 0 , . . . , s * +1 ) be signature A outputs. If e(b 0,1 , s * 0 ) = 1, the verification fails by the definition of Ver. Otherwise, the verification fails except with negligible probability regardless of the output of the adversary since coefficient s 0 of b 0,1 in c 0 (Eq. (24)) is uniform and independent from all the other variables, and the coefficient of b * 0,1 in s * 0 is nonzero. Hence, Adv (6) A (λ) = 1/q. 
